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Rather they are justified by their being made correctly in reference
to necessarily nebulous "fundamental values."
To Tribe's credit, there is no flinching. In Constitutional
Choices he writes that "I find all legitimating theories not simply
amusing in their pretensions but, in the end, as dangerous as they
are unconvincing. "9 Since a Constitution is, at the simplest level, a
set of legitimating procedures embodying a legitimating theory, it
becomes clear that Professor Tribe's quarrel is not really with interpretivists, and not even with the Constitution of the United States,
but with the basic ideas of constitutionalism and majority rule.
What does one make of a distinguished constitutional lawyer
who doubts the possibility of constitutionalism, and whose core
commitment seems to be to a radical subjectivism? Professor Tribe
protests that his position does not amount to "a policy of 'anything
goes' ", but he never succeeds in explaining why it does not-indeed, he makes little effort to do so.
One hopes that a conscientious Senator, instructed by this
book and confronted by such a nominee, would vote against
confirmation.

CONSERVATIVES IN COURT. By Lee Epstein.t Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press. 1985. Pp. xii,
204. $17.95.
Alan B. Morrison 2

I began reading this book with some apprehensions. The
works listed on the back cover as "of related interest" suggested a
substantial possibility of a conservative bias, at least on the publisher's part, and the title page indicated that the book was funded
in part by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, which is known to
be supportive of conservative organizations. I was concerned that
the book would be a paean to the conservative movement and that it
would fail to take a hard look at what was occurring in these organizations. I was nonetheless hopeful that it would provide substantial new data about these organizations-how they operate, what
they are doing, how they are financed, and how their success can be
measured by some objective standard.
L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 6 (1985).
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Methodist University.
2. Mr. Morrison is the Director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington,
D.C., which Ms. Epstein refers to as a "liberal" organization.
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Unfortunately, the author achieved none of these goals. Unlike many other political scientists, Professor Epstein is unsophisticated about litigation. As a result, her book is marred by many
semantic, factual,3 and analytical errors that no experienced observer would make, plus dozens of unhelpful truisms. For example,
she sometimes displays no awareness that the merits of a controversy may be decisive, implausibly attributing conservative defeats
to "better organized" opponents of segregation, or seeming unsure
why "expert attorneys" were unable to persuade the Court that the
nineteenth amendment was improperly adopted. With similar
naivete, she mentions a suit by the Washington Legal Foundation
on behalf of the secret service agent who was shot, along with President Reagan, by John Hinkley. I confess that I have never heard of
this case, although Epstein reports that it has generated considerable publicity. To her, this apparently routine tort suit is a "highly
salient case" that enhanced the reputation of the plaintiff's attorney. One wonders why.
Professor Epstein frequently notes that one organization prefers to file amicus briefs, while another prefers to "sponsor" litigation and still others have recently attempted the tactic of
intervention. But she does not explain the legal and practical significances of these differing approaches. She also fails to supply
data about the frequency with which each organization employs
each of these forms of participation in litigation.
In general, Epstein's data about conservative groups' litigation
is both sketchy and-at times-misleading. For example, when discussing the National Right to Work Committee she first observes
that the Committee has 250 active cases, which sounds like a lot,
but on the next page she reports that there are fourteen staff attorneys plus 100 cooperating outside lawyers, suggesting a rather different picture. Since Epstein does not supply the necessary financial
data, the reader cannot calculate even approximately how many
cases or amicus briefs are produced for a given sum.
The little data she supplies suggests to me that conservative
groups commit vast resources to filing amicus briefs in the Supreme
Court-a phenomenon that cries out for appraisal. Yet Epstein
3. For instance, there was no tax code change in 1939 that caused the spinoff from the
NAACP of its Legal Defense Fund (p. 5); it is not the Federal Register, but the Federal
Reporter that attorneys read to find cases (p. 60); Charles Halpern was not "former clerk at
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals" (p. 119), but a law clerk to a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; and while the NAACP's suit
against the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund over the Fund's continued use of
"NAACP" was successful in 1983 as the book asserts (p. 157, n.l), it was on appeal and
eventually was reversed. NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 753 F.2d 131
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3489 (1985).
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makes no effort to determine whether such briefs are more than
simply echoes of what others are already submitting. Finally, she
seems to suggest that the choice between a role as a "sponsor" for a
party and an amicus is simply made according to the individual
preferences of the group. In fact, financial concerns or the fact that
you are supporting the government often dictate that you can only
be an amicus.
Epstein suggests that amicus briefs may not be very effective, a
view that I share with many others. The book, however, does not
test this hypothesis. Perhaps no meaningful study could be done,
but a survey of judges and their clerks might produce interesting
anecdotal information about the utility of amicus briefs and might
reveal the circumstances in which they are not simply disregarded.
Insofar as Professor Epstein examines the efficacy of amicus
briefs, she does so in a naive manner. In discussing a case in which
the Pacific Legal Foundation filed such a brief, she says that "the
U.S. Supreme Court adopted the PLF's arguments," implying that
only the PLF had made the point. Since the party being supported
in that case was the Secretary of Defense, who was represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, which is universally recognized
as having a very able group of attorneys, and since the point referred to--the need to balance national security concerns against
the environmental issues-is hardly subtle, it strains credulity to
think that but for the PLF's brief, the Justices would have had to
discern that point on their own. If that is the author's view, at least
she should have made clear that an examination of the government's brief revealed no such argument and that therefore a reasonable inference is that it was the PLF which persuaded the Court to
adopt the approach.4
Professor Epstein asserts that one of the "most common traits
of conservative groups has been their tendency to refrain from cooperation in litigation," by which she means that "the conservative
groups have avoided what they consider 'me-too' participation, with
the intention of eliminating needless duplication of effort," contrary
to what she believes are the wasteful practices of liberal groups.
Part of the problem in making these comparisons is that the discussion of liberal groups is based entirely on the research of others,
most of which appears to have focused on the period before 1969,
the time when the public interest movement greatly expanded in
4. Similar overstatements can be found on page 61 regarding the value of an amicus
brief filed by the National Chamber Litigation Center ("the Supreme Court adopted its argument in full''), and on page 87 concerning a brief filed by citizens for Decency Through Law
(whose amicus "arguments were incorporated into the Court's opinion").
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scope, size, and subject matter. Perhaps Epstein's conclusions are
correct, although my own experience is quite to the contrary, as I
have seen several cases in which "me too" briefs have been filed by
conservative legal foundations, not only where other similar groups
were involved, but where their interests were represented by such
"underrepresented organizations" as the United States Government, Duke Power Company, and the Pacific Gas & Electric Company. I recognize, however, that my experiences are not necessarily
typical, nor have they been statistically validated. But then I did
not make so bold an assertion, for if I had, I would surely have
backed it up by detailed charts and tables, which could be readily
assembled from the public dockets.s
Professor Epstein relied too much on secondary sources and on
the views of the attorneys in the groups that she was studying, without any apparent effort to interview their adversaries. Who, for instance, would take the word of Dan Burt, founder of the Capitol
Legal Foundation, on anything about the so-called "Nader network," which he has roundly criticized in his own book? Why
would anyone rely on the views of Raymond Momboisse of the Pacific Legal Foundation, to justify his decision to side with the State
of California against "liberal" public interest law firm challenges to
its authority? Momboisse concluded that "the opposition had the
ability to throw tremendous manpower into the litigation." While
those of us who have litigated on the liberal side may or may not be
skilled attorneys, no one else has ever accused us of having "tremendous manpower," and it is difficult to understand why the author credited such a statement without further inquiry.6
Ideally, this book would have told us something about the finances of conservative legal organizations, a topic that could have
been made even more interesting if coupled with a comparative
analysis of liberal legal groups. Here again, however, Epstein does
not dig very deep. In several places she simply relies on what
people have told her, without even examining the Form 990's that
every organization is required to file with the IRS annually and that
5. The chart on page 77, purporting to show success rates of the economic litigation
groups in the Supreme Court, vastly overstates their importance since a "win" is counted
whenever a group files a brief on the winning side. The more relevant questions are, who was
the group supporting, who else was on that side as an amicus, and did the group add anything
of substance? Numbers like those on page 77 don't begin to scratch the surface of such an
inquiry.
6. Ms. Epstein does report that the AFL-CIO claims that the National Right to Work
Legal Defense Foundation "has not accomplished a great deal and has simply relitigated
well-settled issues." But even that statement is subject to serious doubt since it comes from a
1973 secondary source, which was written several years before the Foundation's success in
the Abood line of cases that the author herself discusses on pages 49-53.

454

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 3:450

are publicly available, except for one schedule listing the names of
large donors. Professor Epstein does not appear to have asked the
groups themselves for detailed financial data, and even with respect
to fundraising, she has not made any real effort to distinguish the
gross amounts raised through the efforts of Richard Viguerie and
others from the net available to the organizations, except to note
that several of the groups broke off their relationships with Viguerie
because he was taking too large a cut for himself.
Similarly, there is no hard data on salaries, with a few minor
exceptions. Indeed, even though James Watt's prior salary at the
Mountain States Legal Foundation was made public when he joined
the Reagan Cabinet (he took a slight pay cut), that figure does not
appear. Given the ability of magazines such as The American Lawyer to probe deep into the books of America's largest and most secretive law firms, it seems likely that any real effort by an interested
researcher, particularly one with conservative credentials, would
have produced some real information about salary levels. For a
scholar who wants to do a comparative study of the differences in
conservative and liberal organizations, salaries should be one of the
first items on the research agenda. 1
Another important question is whether the new conservative
groups are, like their older counterparts, little more than covers for
the economic interests on whose side they so often appear, as exemplified by the test case for the child labor laws that Professor
Epstein discusses. Symptomatic of this problem is that the author
wrote two separate chapters, titled, respectively, Conservative Economic Litigation Since the 1960s and Conservative Public Interest
Litigation Since the 1970s, with little more than a hint that there is
any basis for the charge that there is substantial overlap between
these groups. That question needs to be answered, but it can be
done only by looking very specifically at particular cases and not by
posing general questions of the participants, asking them to describe
the kinds of litigation their group is doing. Once again, my own
experience tells me that the charge that these groups are little more
than covers for big business has substantial merit, although I recognize that in some cases there are philosophical principles at stake in
which it is not simply big business running under a protective public
interest cover. Indeed, Professor Oliver Houck's massive study of
7. One example of the relative financial resources of the conservative law firms is that
in a case in which my group was suing the Federal Government over its refusal to rehire the
fired air controllers, Mountain States Legal Foundation moved to intervene (along with another conservative D.C. group with its own counsel), and flew three lawyers from Denver to
Washington just for that quite routine motion.
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this question, With Charity For Al/,s does the very kind of analysis
not done here from the perspective of the IRS's guidelines on public
interest law firms and concludes that these conservative groups
don't pass the test. And in the area in which the possibility of this
deception is perhaps the greatest-the Right to Work Committee's
efforts to foster its vision of union democracy-there is almost no
attention paid to the very serious issue of whether the vast majority
of the Committee's support for dissident union members comes
from those who would prefer to see no unions at all.
Perhaps the most interesting comment in the book is Epstein's
casual observation that "unlike liberals, conservatives are divided
over the very use of the courts. Many are reluctant to advocate
judicial activism, regardless of ideological bent." That is a very interesting observation, but one which is left dangling with almost no
discussion or analysis. What does the term "conservative" mean in
the context of judicial activism? Is it a political label or a vision of
the role of the courts? Are conservatives, as the quotation seems to
suggest, acting inconsistently because they believe that the courts
should be used for their purposes, but not for those of others with
whom they disagree, or is there an underlying philosophical basis
under which it is truly conservative to use the courts, at least in
some circumstances? Do the answers differ depending on which
side the conservative or liberal is supporting (the individual, a business, or the government), and does that difference, if any, run
through the whole gamut of litigation or does it just exist in certain
areas? Put in soap opera terms, the question, "Can a true conservative find true love in juducial activism?" is one that should have
been asked, but apparently did not occur to the author.
In earlier eras, the typical suit against government was brought
on behalf of a business, and advanced "conservative" legal arguments. Yet over the last few decades the charge of "judicial activism" has been made principally by conservatives who object to
others going to court to overturn executive or legislative decisions.
Yet history shows that at one time these conservatives were either
activists themselves or had that role carried on for them by their
doctrinal forerunners. Even today a very substantial portion of the
challenges to government decisions are brought by businesses and
not by consumers, environmentalists, or civil libertarians. The
point is hinted at in Epstein's book, but she never states the proposition, let alone fully develops it.
There is a related irony in Professor Epstein's discussion of the
8. Houck, With Charity For All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415 (1984). The article includes a
breakdown between amicus and party representation.
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suits brought by those who were opposed to federal welfare in the
1920's, which led to the Supreme Court's decisions in Massachusetts
v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon, holding, respectively, that
neither states nor individual taxpayers have standing to challenge
federal welfare grants. Although the lessons of those cases are
deeply imbedded in my litigating repertoire, I had not focused for
many years on the fact that they were brought by conservatives,
rather than liberals, whereas today many of the challenges to excessive, improper, or unlawful government spending are brought by
taxpayers advancing liberal arguments. But as is so often the case
in administrative law, procedural rulings on issues such as standing
apply to all parties regardless of their political outlooks. In fact, as
Epstein observes, several of the suits of conservative groups ran
aground on standing.9 I wish that she had related this fact to the
more general question of the propriety of conservative legal
activism.
Another interesting observation in the book, which the author
never develops, is that labor and other liberal groups used to file
charges with bar associations against conservative organizations for
allegedly improper conduct in stirring up litigation. That tactic has
now been turned around, as most of the charges go in the opposite
political direction. Yet the author, as in the standing area, never
inquires about the utility of such efforts, in either the short or long
term.
At the end of the book Epstein has a section entitled Success
and Future of Conservative Interest Group Litigation. The reader at
this point expects to find what has been missing all along, a coherent theory about where this movement has come from and where it
is going, yet the author can only muster thirty-one lines, less than
three quarters of a page, in which to state her case. And what a
case it is: "Regardless of the measure used, it is more difficult to
assess the success of the newer conservative groups; the conservative public interest law firms, in particular, are just beginning to get
their feet wet; . . . their ability to achieve such goals depends upon
their ability to attract adequate funding;" and "judicial politics, in
fact, may not be significantly different from the legislative and executive processes, which are widely understood to be characterized by
9. In this regard it is bad enough for the author not to disclose that the Washington
Legal Foundation lost both cases involving the challenges to the transfer of the Panama Canal and the termination of the Taiwan Treaty, but to cite the cases as events that "helped the
WLF to solidify its reputation within the conservative community in the capital" suggests
that conservatives are impressed by filing suits, with no concern for the outcome, a view I
would not attribute to thoughtful strategists of any political stripe.
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the presence of competing group interests." 10
What this book could and should have been is a serious examination of the role played by the various conservative organizations
currently part of today's legal scene. Are they simply covers for
business organizations? Do some of them simply echo the positions
taken by law enforcement officials? Are there groups that truly represent individuals who otherwise have no representation, the criterion that those of us in the liberal public interest movement believe
describes the proper role of the public interest lawyer? Who exactly
are these conservative groups, what are they doing, how effective
are they, and what would be lost to the system if not another penny
went to support them? Where do judicial activism and restraint fit
into long-term conservative strategy? I do not know the answers to
many of these questions, but I do know that I cannot find them in
Conservatives in Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECTS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS. By Leonard W. Levy.1 Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. 272. $29.95.
Donald 0. Dewey2

When a historian's second volume of essays is published, you
know he is both prolific and influential. If that historian is Leonard
Levy, you also know the essays will be trenchant, controversial, and
often witty.
This selection of twelve essays concentrates primarily on first
and fifth amendment freedoms-especially those concerning speech,
press and religion and the freedom against compulsory self-incrimination. Most of the essays come from the 1980's, though one was
printed as early as 1961 and another in 1962. Two have never
10. In several places Epstein tries to draw a distinction between conservative groups
and their liberal counterparts by statements, such as the following, that set up contrasts that
are meaningless to me: "Its founders believed that the [Pacific Legal Foundation] would
handle legal issues rather than advocate specific causes arising in California and dealing with
the environment, in particular" (p. 121). See also (or perhaps compare) at 122-23: the PLF
"has not attempted to bring test cases to court. Rather, PLF attorneys 'have been involved in
systematic [litigation] campaigns ... from the other side' ... by putting liberal groups on the
defensive." (The example cited is an amicus brief supporting the Navy.) See also discussion
on page 50 contrasting the strategy of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and
the Right to Work Legal Defense Fund and the discussions of various strategies on page 132.
I. Andrew W. Mellon All Claremont Professor of Humanities and Chairman of the
Graduate Faculty of History at Claremont Graduate School.
2. Professor of History and Dean of Natural and Social Sciences at California State
University, Los Angeles.

